The Contradiction Between Rhetoric and Action: Erdoğan’s Policy Toward Israel


 The Contradiction Between Rhetoric and Action: Erdoğan’s Policy Toward Israel


Author Gouya Roshan (Güya Aydın)

The Contradiction Between Rhetoric and Action: Erdoğan’s Policy Toward Israel
The Contradiction Between Rhetoric and Action: Erdoğan’s Policy Toward Israel, Azerbaijan, and the Realities of Regional Politics

Over the past decade, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly presented himself as one of the fiercest critics of Tel Aviv’s regional policies and has sharply condemned Israel, particularly Benjamin Netanyahu. These positions, especially on sensitive issues surrounding Palestine, have resonated widely among public opinion in the Islamic world. However, a closer examination of Turkey’s foreign policy reveals a deep and structural gap between these harsh statements and the actual actions of Erdoğan’s government.

At the political level, Erdoğan accuses Israel of human rights violations and crimes against Palestinians
(which is, of course, true)
and at times speaks of “serious measures” or a “decisive response.” Yet in practice, diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Israel have never been fundamentally severed. Trade relations, indirect security cooperation, and repeated efforts to normalize ties indicate that verbal threats serve more of a symbolic and propagandistic function than a strategic or practical one.

This duality means that Erdoğan’s threats have neither deterred the Israeli state nor altered the real power dynamics in the region. The constant repetition of harsh slogans without practical backing has gradually undermined the credibility of this discourse and turned it into a tool for manipulating public opinion, particularly within Turkey’s domestic audience.

One of the most significant manifestations of this contradiction is evident in Turkey’s close relations with Azerbaijan and President Ilham Aliyev. Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s most important suppliers of oil, and a substantial portion of this energy export is carried out through infrastructure and routes in which Turkey has a direct or indirect stake. This reality confronts Erdoğan’s claim of serious confrontation with Netanyahu’s government with a fundamental question: how can one simultaneously threaten Israel while participating in its energy supply chain?

Notably, Erdoğan has not only exerted no meaningful pressure on Baku to reconsider its relations with Israel, but he also regards the strategic alliance with Azerbaijan as a cornerstone of his regional policy. This alliance is based on geopolitical interests, energy considerations, and power calculations—not on moral principles or religious solidarity. Contrary to today’s commonly portrayed image, relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have not always been warm and close. Prior to Erdoğan’s rise to power, relations between the two countries were cautious and cool due to political and sectarian reasons. Azerbaijan is a country with a Shiite majority, whereas Turkey, with its secular political structure and dominance of Sunni Islam, viewed the influence of political Shiism in Turkic-speaking regions with great sensitivity. This sectarian difference, combined with security considerations, was seen as a major obstacle to strategic rapprochement between Ankara and Baku.

During the same period, relations between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan were at an acceptable and at times even cordial level. Shared religious ties, social connections, and Iran’s role in the early years of Azerbaijan’s independence provided the groundwork for political and economic cooperation between the two countries. This historical reality demonstrates that ethnic and linguistic ties alone were not the determining factors in regional relations; religion and political ideology played a more decisive role.

With Erdoğan’s ascent to power, Turkey’s foreign policy underwent a fundamental transformation. Previous sensitivities were set aside, and relations with Azerbaijan were redefined on the basis of geopolitical interests, energy projects, and pan-Turkist approaches. This shift rapidly elevated relations between Ankara and Baku to the level of a strategic alliance—even if that alliance indirectly served Israeli interests.

In this context, it becomes clear that Erdoğan’s hardline stance against Netanyahu stems more from shifting political expediency than from firm and uncompromising principles. Economic interests, particularly in the energy sector, and regional power considerations effectively define the red lines of Turkey’s foreign policy.

The contradiction between Erdoğan’s rhetoric and his actions—especially regarding Israel, Azerbaijan, and energy—reveals a deep fissure in Turkey’s foreign policy. As long as this gap persists, Erdoğan’s loud threats against Netanyahu, no matter how effective they may be in the media, will have no real impact on the region’s power dynamics in practice. These positions reflect not a genuine desire for change, but a pragmatic policy in which regional political interests take precedence over moral slogans.

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